In 2014, Yang et al. proposed a new dynamic ID-based user authentication scheme based on smart card which is believed to have many abilities to resist a range of network attacks. However, this paper analyzes the security of Yang et al.'s scheme and then shows that the scheme not only is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, but also does not provide the unlinkability property and user anonymity because of the identity guessing attack unlike their claims.
Introduction
Remote user authentication schemes are used to verify the legitimacy of remote users' login request. In verifier-free authentication scheme, the user's login identity ID is always static [1] . It means that it can be leak partial information related with the user's login messages. Furthermore, an adversary can use the information to forge the user's login messages by some subtle means. One of the solutions to eliminate this security problem is to employ dynamic identity ID in different login session [1, 2, 3, 4] .
In 2004, Das et al. [1] first proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme which can resist replay, masquerade, and insider attacks. In 2007, Wang et al. [2] , however, pointed out that Das et al.'s scheme is susceptible to smart card attack and does not provide mutual authentication. Then they proposed a more efficient and secure dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme. In 2011, Khan et al. [3] , however, pointed out that Wang et al.'s scheme still is susceptible to insider attack and does not provide user's anonymity and session key agreement. They also proposed a new dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme. In 2014, Yang et al. [4] pointed out that previously proposed schemes have weaknesses because of using timestamps and lead to serious clock synchronization problems and then proposed an enhanced dynamic ID-based remote user authentication (in short, ERUA) scheme. Yang et al. claimed that the proposed ERUA scheme provides mutual authentication using a challenge-response handshake and user's anonymity.
This paper researches Yang et al. ' s ERUA scheme and then shows that the ERUA scheme not only is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, but also does not provide the unlinkability property [5] and user anonymity because of the identity guessing attack [6, 7] unlike their claims. For this reason, Yang et al.'s ERUA scheme is insecure for practical application.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review Yang et al.'s ERUA scheme in Section 2. The security flaws of Yang et al.'s ERUA scheme are presented in Section 3. Finally, we draw some conclusions in Section 4.
Review of Yang et al.'s ERUA Scheme
This section reviews the Yang et al.'s ERUA scheme [4] . Throughout the paper, notations are employed in Table 1 . The ERUA scheme is divided into four phase: registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, and password change phase.
Registration phase
A user U i with identifier ID i should first carry out this phase once before he/she can use any of the services provided by the server S. In this phase, U i and S need to perform the following steps: ID i An identity of the user U i .
P W i A password of the user U i .
h(·)
A secure one-way hash function.
x A secret key of server S.
User U i keys his/her identity ID i and password P W i , and his/her smart card computes and submits
, where x is the permanent secret key of S. Then, S sends {h(·), B i , C i } to U i through a secure channel.
Login phase
Whenever U i wants to login a server S, he/she must perform the following steps:
L1. After inserting his/her smart card into the card reader, U i inputs the identity ID i and password P W i . Then, the smart card computes
L2. The smart card checks whether or not E i and C i are equal. If yes, U i passes the legitimate verification and performs the following steps; otherwise, U i is rejected.
L3. The smart card randomly chooses a nonce R 1 and computes
sends the login request message {h(ID i ), F i } to the remote server S.
Authentication phase
A user performs the remote authentication phase based on the login message for authentication as long as it visits the server. U i and S perform the following steps to achieve mutual authentication and to establish a session key:
A1. After receiving the login message {h(ID i ),
Then, S chooses a nonce R 2 and computes
The server S sends the mutual authentication message {H i , h(R 1 )} to the user U i .
After receiving the mutual authentication message {H i , h(R 1 )} from the server S, the user U i checks whether or not h(R 1 ) and h(R 1 ) are equal. If no, U i rejects this message and terminates the operation; otherwise, U i authenticates S successfully and computes
A4. When the server S receives {h(R 2 )}, S checks whether or not h(R 2 ) and h(R 2 ) are equal. If no, S sends reject message to the U i ; otherwise, S authenticates U i .
After finishing mutual authentication phase, the user U i and the server S each can compute a common session key SK = h(R 1 ||R 2 ) for the next data transmission.
Password change phase
The user U i can change his/her password without the help of the server S, and the details of the password change procedures are as follows:
C1. U i inserts the smart card, and input his/her old password P W i and the identity ID i . to finish the password change phase.
C2. The smart card computes
A i = B i ⊕ h(ID i ||P W i ), C i = h(A i ),
Security Vulnerabilities of ERUA Scheme
This section demonstrates that Yang et al.'s ERUA scheme [4] is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and does not provide the unlinkability property and user anonymity because of the identity guessing attack unlike their claims. The details of these flaws are described as follows:
User anonymity problem
Users' anonymity is an important security requirement that a practical dynamic identity-based remote authentication scheme should achieve [7] . In the Yang et al.s ERUA scheme, they claimed that their proposed scheme preserves user anonymity because a user's real identity ID i is concealed in the h(ID i ). However, we show that Yang et al.s ERUA scheme [4] still fails to achieve the anonymity as follows:
1. Eve intercepts a login message {h(ID i ), F i } of U i of a previous session. 6 and the time complexities T h are also negligible, thus Eve can complete the above procedure in polynomial time [6, 7] .
Eve guesses an identity ID

Linkability attack
Unlinkability is a property which means an adversary cannot recognize whether outputs are from the same user, and this property is important with respect to the privacy problem in the anonymous user identification [5] . However, Yang et al.'s ERUA scheme cannot provide unlinkability property. That is, an adversary Eve can eavesdrop the user U i 's login request message {h(ID i ), F i } between the user U i and the server S from the public channel; h(ID i ) in the login request message {h(ID i ), F i } is kept the same in every login session. In other words, a malicious adversary Eve is capable of tracing out the user U i according to h(ID i ) which is in the U i 's login request message. For example, Eve can perform the following attack to break user privacy and anonymity.
1. In any session, Eve intercepts user's login request message {h(ID i ), F i }.
Eve checks whether both h(ID i ) is equal to h(ID i ). If this condition
is true, it means that ID i ≡ ID i . So, the attacker can know this login request message {h(ID i ), F i } is sent from the same user U i .
As a result, anyone can decide whether two transactions {h(ID i ), F i } and {h(ID i ), F i } are of the same user U i or not by checking if the following equation
The above linkability security problem in the ERUA scheme happens because anyone can easily check whether the intercepted two transactions are from the same user or not. Therefore, Yang et al.'s ERUA scheme fails in unlinkability property of U i during the login phase.
Off-line password guessing attack
Moreover, Eve can obtain the password P W i of U i by using the ID * i . Suppose that the user U i 's smart card is lost or stolen, then the attacker Eve can extract the stored secret information {h(·), B i , C i } stored in the smart card. Eve cam extract the stored secret information by monitoring their timing information, power consumption and reverse engineering techniques. Then, Eve can perform the off-line password guessing attack as follows:
1. Eve selects a candidate password P W * i
Eve checks if the following equation holds or not
If the check passes, then Eve confirms that the guessed password P W * i is the correct one.
3. If it is not correct, Eve chooses another password P W * * i and repeatedly performs above step (2) until
It is clear that if P W *
Therefore, Yang et al.s ERUA scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack. The algorithm of the off-line password guessing attack for getting the password P W * i is as follows:
The running time of the above password guessing attack is (O(
, where T c and T x represent the execution time of concatenation and bit-wise XOR operations, respectively. The search spaces D ID and D P W are unlikely to be large enough (for example, |D ID | ≤ 10 6 and |D P W | ≤ 10 6 ), and the time complexities T c , T h and T x all can be executed with negligible amount of time, thus the polynomial time-bounded adversary Eve can find the exact password P W i of U i easily [6, 7] .
Conclusions
This paper reviewed Yang et al.'s ERUA scheme and then pointed out that the ERUA scheme scheme is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and does not provide the unlinkability property and user anonymity because of the identity guessing attack unlike their claims. Consequently Yang et al.'s ERUA scheme is insecure for practical application. Further works will be focused on improving the ERUA's scheme which can be able to provide greater security and to be more efficient than the existing dynamic ID-based remote user authentication schemes by an accurate performance analysis.
